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of Panentheism
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1. Introduction
The recent literature on panentheism often starts with two claims. First, one 
is reminded of the recent popularity of the term ›panentheism‹ across phi-
losophy of religion, systematic theology, the comparative study of world re-
ligions, science and religion, and naturalistic spirituality.1 Through numbers, 
if not through arguments, »the panentheistic turn« is presented as »a doctri-
nal revolution«, which cannot be ignored by either critics or sympathisers.2 
Second, one is presented with a problem; namely, that no one knows exactly 
what panentheism means or how it can be demarcated from similar views—
even demarcated from the very view panentheism is commonly pitted against, 
namely classical theism.
The central claims of panentheism, which are often used to define the posi-
tion, are that ›the world is the body of God‹ and ›the world is in God‹. In order 
to avoid predetermining whether these phrases should be taken literally or 
metaphorically, I refer to these claims throughout this paper as ›the panenthe-
istic slogans‹. These slogans are evocative but cannot illuminate panentheism’s 
distinctive claims regarding God’s relationship to the world without further 
analysis. As a result, there is a growing collection of secondary literature seek-
ing to interpret these slogans in a way that clearly demarcates panentheism 
from neighbouring theological positions.3 This paper contributes to this sec-
ondary literature.
However, there are also scholars who criticise the search for a clear demar-
cation for missing the point of panentheism entirely.4 As Thomas C. Owen 
notes, some panentheists seem to view the fluidity or vagueness of their posi-
tion as part of its attraction.5 The implication is that the gathering together of 
1   See, Clayton and Peacocke 2004; Biernacki and Clayton 2014.
2   Clayton 1999; Brierley 2004: 4.
3   Mullins 2016; Göcke 2013; Gasser 2019 Brierly 2008: 636-41; Peterson 2001; Stenmark 2019; 
Gregerson 2004; Towne 2005; Hutchings 2010.
4   Lataster 2014; Lataster & Bilimoria 2018.
5   Thomas C. Owen justly critiques Philip Clayton for glossing such ambiguity as ›richness‹. 
Owen 2008: 653-53; cf. Clayton 2004: 254, 256.
Joanna Leidenhag - 9783957437303
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com07/23/2020 03:11:22PM
via free access
66 Joanna Leidenhag
various warring parties in religious discourse under the panentheist’s banner 
of relationality, naturalness, scientific credibility, and embodied spirituality, is 
a good to which clear definitions should be willingly sacrificed.6 For such a 
purpose, emphasising »family resemblances« between even the most dispa-
rate positions is enough.7 However, this paper rejects this all-inclusive framing 
of either the content or purpose of panentheism. In the marketplace of aca-
demia, a clear demarcation between one’s own theory or the family in which 
a theory is found and one’s competitors is an essential part of any sales pitch, 
elst the various members of the family might be adopted into other dynasties.
For all its celebration of unity, panentheism remains a polemical position 
and is presented as either »the other God of the philosophers«, the reasonable 
»middle path between two extremes« (dualistic classical theism and atheistic 
pantheism), or the »higher synthesis« between supernaturalism and atheistic 
naturalism.8 If we cannot demarcate panentheism from these neighbouring 
positions, then not only does panentheism lose its competitive edge and much 
of its explanatory power, but the gathering of ambiguously related theories 
under the umbrella of panentheism becomes superfluous; panentheism would 
amount to »a somewhat suspect ›fudge‹ word.«9 Process panentheist David 
Ray Griffin warns that »increased popularity brings a danger that ›panenthe-
ism‹ will be appropriated for doctrines devoid of [its] promise.«10 If panenthe-
ism amounts to the popularity of an ambiguous slogan, rather than a genuinely 
shared understanding of the relationship between God and the world, then the 
panentheist umbrella seems unlikely to weather any future storms.
Yet there might be a way to avoid this dreary forecast. As Thomas writes, one 
»major exception to this vagueness in the concept of panentheism« is found 
in the work of Process philosophy.11 Whilst few can deny the historical impor-
tance of Process theology within the panentheist family (particularly in the 
West where the name, but perhaps not the original idea, was coined), Process 
panentheism is often treated as the grandparent whose leadership of the fam-
ily has been surpassed by younger generations. Thankfully, this paper has no 
6    One might point to the value-based and political arguments for panentheism in Jantzen 
1984 and McFague 1993.
7    Clayton 2004: 249. Indeed, Philip Clayton describes both the classical theism of John 
Cooper and the atheistic pantheism of Robert Corrington as versions of panentheism, 
such that one is forced to asked what the term ›panentheism‹ excludes? See, Clayton 2017.
8    Cooper 2007; Brierley 2004: 3; Hartshorne & Reese 1953: 5.
9    Roe 198: 94. Patrick Hutching simply states that, to commit myself to panentheism is dis-
ingenuous since »I am—as I see it—committing myself to nothing.« Hutching 2010: 299.
10   Griffin 2005: 35.
11   Brierly 2004: 3.
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interest in defending Process theology, nor holding Process panentheism up as 
the exemplary for panentheists more widely. Instead, this paper investigates 
if a particular theory of mind, one that Process philosophy shares with many 
other historical figures, can provide the resources to demarcate panentheism 
from neighbouring theological positions. The theory of mind in question is 
panpsychism.
This raises an immediate methodological question; quite simply, what’s 
mind got to do with it? Although often taken for granted, it is not immedi-
ately transparent what a position in philosophy of mind has to do with the 
God-world relationship, nor how strong the relationship between mentality 
and divinity should be. On the one hand, it has been asserted that »on any pos-
sible reading of the panpsychic system« the world must be »internal parts of 
God and not external creations«.12 On the other hand, the historical preference 
for panpsychism by panentheists may be little more than coincidence, since 
there seems no good reason why the God of classical theism could not have 
chosen to create a panpsychist universe quite apart from Godself.13 It seems 
safest to conclude that adopting a panpsychist theory of mind cannot deter-
mine one’s theology. Moreover, if God is the source of all being, then perhaps 
philosophy of mind should play second fiddle to philosophy of religion. If this 
is correct then panpsychism cannot and should not, determine one’s theology.14
This brief methodological excursus allows me to be clear about the scope 
and ambition of this paper’s analysis. It is precisely because panentheists 
have certain primary theological commitments regarding the God-world re-
lationship that this paper explores whether panpsychism can facilitate and 
clarify those commitments. Within this paper, philosophy of mind is serving 
12   James, 1947: 318; cf. Cooper 2007: 141.
13   Taliaferro 2017. This preference is noted in Cooper 2007: 193. However, classical theist 
Gottfried von Leibniz and pantheist Bauarch Spinoza, provide clear counter examples of 
how panpsychism can support various theological positions. Skrbina 2005: 87-91, 95-99.
14   R.T. Mullins raises something like this objection against demarcations where, »[a]ll the 
demarcating work is being done on the side of creation«, since »panentheism is supposed 
to be making a unique claim about the nature of God.« Mullins 2016: 342. But this seems 
to mischaracterize panentheism. Panentheism is primarily a statement about God’s rela-
tionship with the world, not about God’s nature in abstraction or considered apart from 
the world. Indeed, to many panentheists the idea of making a unique claim about the 
nature of God apart from the world would be to miss the point entirely (see, Henrikson, 
2017: 1083; Gregersen 2004: 20; Meister 2017: 8; Peters 2007: 285). A God-world relation-
ship may, of course, have strong implications for the attributes of God etc., such as seen 
in the panentheists tendency to accept divine passibility, mutability and deny creatio ex 
nihilo, but as Mullins shows these ideas alone fail to demarcate panentheism. On the in-
sufficiency of these demarcations see, Stenmark 2019; Mullins 2016: 344-336; Göcke, 2013: 
71-72; Lataster & Bilimoria 2018: 59-60.
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as handmaiden to philosophy of religion. Panpsychism neither gives rise to, 
nor determines the beliefs of panentheism, and there is no argument here 
that panentheists are panpsychists by default (nor vice versa). Indeed, I do 
not think panpsychists should adopt panentheism as the theological expan-
sion of their commitments.15 Instead, the central question of this paper is only 
whether panpsychism provides a useful framework for interpreting the two 
panentheistic slogans, such that panentheists may use panpsychism to demar-
cate themselves from their neighbours and rivals.
To achieve this, the section below will define panpsychism by providing four 
core theses that demarcate panpsychism from neighbouring theories of mind 
and provide the boundaries for identifying one’s theory as panpsychist. I then 
provide seven auxiliary theses that specify versions of panpsychism currently 
offered within this boundary. Not only is this necessary, since two ambiguities 
do not equal a clarity, but may serve as something of a model for the kind of 
demarcation we are hoping for with regard to panentheism. Whilst there may 
be a general correspondence between the aims of panentheism and panpsy-
chism, vague gestures towards a correspondence between these theories is a 
relatively unhelpful exercise, particularly if the goal is to clarify panentheism’s 
distinct claims. As such, the specific variants (seven auxiliary theses) within 
the panpsychist theory of consciousness are essential for the second task of 
this paper; to test whether particular versions of panpsychism can illuminate 
the two panentheistic slogans. The demarcation is in the details.
2. Panpsychism
The word ›panpsychism‹ can be translated to the general claim that all (pan) 
is mental (psyche), yet this should not be confused with animism, vitalism, 
or idealism. Popular definitions amongst contemporary panpsychists are that 
»mentality is fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world«, »the view 
that the basic physical constituents of the universe have mental properties«, 
»physical nature is composed of individuals, each of which is to some degree 
sentient … [has] experience, or in a broad sense, consciousness«, or more 
colloquially that »everything has a soul … or a rudiment of a soul.«16 While 
these definitions provide a general idea of what panpsychism is about, a more 
15   I should acknowledge that I do not subscribe to panentheism or Process theology, but do 
consider panpsychism the most plausible position in philosophy of mind.
16   Goff, Seager & Allen-Hermanson 2017; Nagel 1979: 181; Sprigge 1998; Popper & Eccles 
1977: 15.
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precise list of Panpsychism’s Core Theses (PCT) are required to show that pan-
psychism is a coherent and demarcated position within philosophy of mind.
 Panpsychism’s Core Theses
The first core thesis is:
PCT1: At least some physical organisms are phenomenally conscious. (Mental 
Realism)
Phenomenal consciousness refers to the qualitative, subjective, experience or 
feeling of ›what it is to be like‹ an organism.17 The felt quality of an experi-
ence is said to be the phenomenal character of that experience; for example, 
the reddish quality of seeing the colour red. According to panpsychists, phe-
nomenality is a real and irreducible feature of this world. The first core thesis 
demarcates panpsychism from reductive physicalism in its various forms (e.g. 
eliminativism, behaviourism, functionalism).
The second core thesis is:
PCT2: Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, and thus can neither arise 
out of, nor be reduced to anything wholly lacking in phenomenal consciousness. 
(Non-Emergence and Irreducibility)
A panpsychist does not merely believe that phenomenal consciousness ex-
ists but argues that phenomenality is a really hard fact to account for in a 
fundamentally physical world.18 If organic consciousness (phenomenal con-
sciousness of material organisms) is real and neither reducible nor strongly 
emergent, then »there must be some secret properties of matter with a direct 
connection to consciousness«.19 Weak and Strong Emergentists, however, will 
disagree with these claims and so PCT2 demarcates panpsychism from emer-
gence theory.
Since a traditional substance dualist or hylomorphist can hold to PCT1 and 
PCT2, a further core thesis is required to demarcate panpsychism from these 
two alternative positions. I propose that a third core thesis of panpsychism 
should be,
PCT3: Whatever is fundamental for materiality is also fundamental for mental-
ity, since there is only one fundamental level of reality. (Fundamental Monism)
17   Sprigge 1971: 166-68; Nagel 1974; Chalmers 1995.
18   Galen Strawson 2008: 60-67; Brogaard, 2017: 131-137.
19   Coleman 2018a: 185.
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For panpsychists then, unlike traditional substance dualists or hylomorphists, 
the individual phenomenal consciousness experienced by human beings is 
not itself fundamental, but it can be accounted for by positing a single, funda-
mental, psychophysical ground to reality.
This fundamental monism underpins a large portion of the general cor-
respondences between panpsychism and panentheism. First, just as panen-
theism seeks the path between monistic pantheism and theological dualism, 
panpsychism proposes a route between reductive physicalism and substance 
dualism. Second, just as panentheism wishes to talk of God and the world as 
a ›qualified non-dualism‹ (Vishishtadvaita) where two realities form a single 
unity, so do many panpsychists speak of mind and matter as the two proper-
ties of a shared neutral substance or as the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of 
any one entity.20 Third, for panentheists, infinity is a monistic category that 
includes all finite realities, and for the panpsychist fundamentality is a mo-
nistic category that grounds all beings and includes both material and mental 
properties. Fourth, just as a panpsychist seeks to naturalise the mind, so too do 
many panentheists seek a naturalistic version of theism.
Finally, one should state a fourth core thesis for panpsychism:
PCT4: Fundamental consciousness is necessary for explaining organic 
consciousness.
Panpsychism posits consciousness at the fundamental level of reality because 
it provides an explanation for organic consciousness. If fundamental con-
sciousness does not and will never aid (in any way) in explaining organic con-
sciousness, then panpsychists should abandon their position.21 As such, how 
best to specify PCT4 is a major conundrum for panpsychists, better known as 
›the combination problem‹.22 Phrased as a question, the combination problem 
asks: what is the relationship between fundamental consciousness and human 
subjects, just that the former aids in explaining the existence of the latter? The 
hard-nut of this question is, more specifically, how does the adding together of 
many single perspectives result in a composite but unified conscious whole? 
20   Meister 2017: 3. See, Stubenberg 2017; Chalmers 2015.
21   There are versions of panpsychism that are not so reliant on providing an explanation of 
organic consciousness, and instead seek to provide explanations to one of the other peri-
neal mysteries of philosophy; such as causation. However, within philosophy of mind, I 
take it that all theories raison d’etre is to provide an explanation of organic consciousness.
22   This is a very old problem discussed by Lucretius, Leibniz, and William James, but the 
conundrum was given its modern name in Seager 1995. For a thorough discussion see, 
Chalmers 2017b: 179-214.
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Whilst the combination problem has yet to be expressed as a defeater against 
panpsychism, it remains an open question that requires (and is currently re-
ceiving) further research.23 As panpsychists debate between themselves how 
to specify PCT4, this conundrum holds the competing mind-body ontologies 
in a stalemate; the combination problem is comparable to the interaction 
problem for substance dualists, or the question of how mind emerges from 
mindless matter for the emergentist. It may simply be a matter of which mys-
tery one is happy to live with.
With these core theses we have successfully defined panpsychism and de-
marcated it from the other major positions in philosophy of mind. A specific 
version of panpsychism will require auxiliary theses, upon which panpsychists 
may disagree whilst still identifying their position with the panpsychist camp. 
As mentioned above, these auxiliary theses will be important for interpreting 
the panentheistic slogans of divine embodiment and interiority.
 Panpsychism’s Auxiliary Theses
The seven auxiliary theses stated below are organised into three semi-
independent categories. First, whilst panpsychists all agree that mentality is 
found at the fundamental level they differ on how to specify the nature of this 
primitive mentality (Aux1-3). No living panpsychists I know of posit rational, 
volitional, self-conscious, emotional, imaginative, etc. minds as fundamental—
but prefer to use phrases such as »thin subjects« or »raw feels«.24 The kind of 
mental life enjoyed by human beings is taken to be the result of the complexity 
and evolutionary development of these basic subjects. On panpsychism, you 
can’t get something from nothing (pace strong emergence) and there really is 
something there (pace reductive physicalism), but we may be able to get more 
mental life from less—the question is ›how much less?‹. Currently a panpsy-
chist has a choice between three auxiliary theses on this matter:
Aux1:  Basic subjects, which have simple momentary experiences, exist at the 
fundamental level. (Subject Panpsychism)
The panpsychists who reject Aux1 do so either because it is too counterintui-
tive or because it bares the full force of the combination problem; it demands 
23   Sam Coleman describes the combination problem »represents a major theoretical ›I owe 
you‹ of the panexperientialist/panpsychist. But that there is work to be done does not 
imply the falsity of a view, and there are avenues to be explored.« Coleman 2006: 51.
24   ›Thin subjects‹ or »SESMETs« are what Galen Strawson uses to refer to subjects that per-
sist only for the briefest period of time, Strawson 2009. ›Raw feels‹ is a phrase taken from 
Toleman 1932 to refer to features of our mental life that science cannot capture.
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an account of how subjects combine to form larger subjects. To avoid these 
issues some panpsychists prefer:
Aux2:  Proto-phenomenal properties, but not phenomenal experience or sub-
jects, are found at the fundamental level. (Panprotopsychism)
Whilst panprotopsychism does not demand an account of subject combina-
tion, it does still require an account of how phenomenal experiences arise 
from proto-phenomenal properties without violating PTC2. Moreover, whilst 
some panprotopsychists name specific properties, such as qualities or in-
tentions, we cannot really know what proto-phenomenal properties are. 
Panprotopsychism, therefore, seems threaten by noumenalism.25 If Aux1 is too 
counterintuitive, and Aux2 appears too mysterious, then the third option is:
Aux3:  There are experiences, but no subjects to experience them, at the funda-
mental level. (Panexperientialism)
This is the option preferred, almost exclusively, by Process theologians since it 
requires an event-based, and not substance-based, ontology to make sense of 
experiences floating free of subjects.
The second disagreement between panpsychists is in how to specify what is 
fundamental, or perhaps more clearly, where the fundamental level of reality 
is (Aux4-5). As argued above, the panpsychist needs to hold to fundamental 
monism (PTC3) and this leaves panpsychists with only two choices. The first 
option is,
Aux4:  The cosmos is made up from a plurality of fundamental psychophysical 
micro-entities. (Micropsychism).
Simply put, the fundamental level of reality is where the building-blocks for 
all that exists are found (e.g. quarks and photons, or whatever is described by 
a completed physics). It is largely due to the success of reductionistic explana-
tions in the natural sciences that the majority of Western panpsychists retain 
the spirit of reductionism by holding to micropsychism alongside microphysi-
calism (that physical things are explained in virtue of their physical parts). In 
order to satisfy PTC4, micropsychists typically seek models of mental combi-
nation. However, Eastern forms of panpsychism, Absolute idealism, and the 
rise of environmental holism has also meant that some panpsychists, instead, 
favour:
25   See, panqualityism in Coleman 2018b and panintentionalism in Pfeifer 2016.
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Aux5:   The cosmos as a single psychophysical whole is fundamental. 
(Cosmopsychism).
More recently, some analytic philosophers of mind have come to prefer Aux5 
over Aux4, due to the perception that PCT4 will be easier to maintain.26 That 
is, it is hoped that a theory of subject individuation will be easier than a theory 
of subject combination. This view is influenced by Jonathan Schaffer’s account 
of priority monism, where the one and only fundamental entity is the cosmos.27
The third set of auxiliary theses outline two types of relation between fun-
damental subjects and human or organic subjects; namely, constitutive and 
non-constitutive relations. The literature on the combination problem is too 
large to survey fully here but I will give four example solutions from: constitu-
tive combination, non-constitutive combination, constitutive individuation, 
and non-constitutive individuation. It is these examples that are most relevant 
for the present discussion since they specify how different panpsychists under-
stand the mind-body relation and what it means for a mind to be ›in‹ another 
mind.
The first type of relation is a constitutive relation, where all the true state-
ments about human consciousness are (wholly or partially) grounded in 
true statements about fundamental consciousness.28 To use a (controversial) 
metaphor from ecclesiology, if individual members of a church are seen to be 
prior to the church itself, then the existence of the church might be said to be 
grounded in the existence of its members. In this case, the church just is the 
sum of its members. However, if the church (perhaps as a spiritual reality) is 
logically prior to it having any members, then being a member of the church 
is a state of affairs about an individual that is grounded in the existence of 
church (itself, probably grounded in something else, like the will of God). In 
both cases, the grounding entities are prior to and more fundamental than the 
grounded entities. That is, truths about human consciousness are true in vir-
tue of the fact that they are also, perhaps primarily, true about fundamental 
consciousness.
Aux6:  All true facts about organic consciousness are true in virtue of facts about 
fundamental mentality. (Constitutive Panpsychism)
26   Goff 2017b; Nagasawa & Weger 2017; Jaskolla & Buck 2012.
27   Schaffer 2010. Schaffer’s account is different to cosmopsychism primarily because Schaffer 
identifies as a materialist.
28   Chalmers, 2017b, 181; Cf. Fine 2012; Scheaffer 2009.
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On this view, the organic subject is the sum of its fundamental parts (if com-
bined with Aux4) or a part of a larger subject (with Aux5). All the organic 
subject’s properties and causal powers are metaphysically necessitated by 
the properties and powers found at the fundamental level. This is sometimes 
phrased as an ›ontological free lunch‹, since the organic subject is nothing 
›over-and-above‹ fundamental mentality.29
For many panpsychists, the advantage of Aux6 is that it retains a bottom-up, 
scientific (even quasi-reductionist) account of consciousness, parallel to ma-
terial sciences. The materialist will hold to a constitutive relation like this be-
tween fundamental physical facts and organic material/mental facts, whereas 
a constitutive panpsychist will hold to a constitutive relation between funda-
mental mental facts and organic mental facts (facts about the mental life of 
organisms). The main advantage is that constitutive relations seem best suited 
for accounting for mental causation in a bottom-up fashion alongside physical 
causation.30
A proposed constitutive combinatorial solution (Aux4 + Aux6) to the com-
bination problem is Philip Goff ’s idea of Phenomenal Bonding. Goff has pro-
posed that, just as fundamental entities have intrinsic phenomenal properties 
(subjectivity, experience) and extrinsic material properties (mass, spin, loca-
tion), so too might relations between such entities have intrinsic phenomenal 
relational properties which facilitate subject combination.31 Similarly, Gregg 
Rosenberg’s ›carrier hypothesis‹ has proposed that causation is a fundamental 
relation that has a phenomenal interiority to it, as part of his argument for pan-
psychism from causation.32 The biggest challenge for Phenomenal Bonding is 
to give a more positive account of what these ›bonds‹ are, where they are, and 
how they structure the mental aspect of the world such that some things, like 
organisms, are conscious as single collective wholes, and other things (like 
tables and slippers) are not.
Philip Goff has more recently argued that constitutive panpsychists should, 
instead, adopt Cosmopsychism (Aux5). Whilst this provides some relief from 
providing a positive account of combinatorial relations, it still requires an 
29   Goff 2017b: 226-27.
30   Chalmers 2017b: 193.
31   Philip Goff abandons his own idea in favour of a constitutive cosmopsychism. Others are 
more hopeful that ›phenomenal bonds‹ might yet provide the best way forward; Miller 
2017; Chalmers 2017b.
32   Goff 2009, Goff 2017a. As such, Rosenberg argues that panpsychism not only offers a so-
lution to the mind-body problem, but also to what intrinsic or categorical natures carry 
the structures of causality in our world. Rosenberg 2004. See also, Mørch 2014; Mørch 
forthcoming.
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account of constitutive individuation. Goff refers to this as Grounding by 
Subsumption; all true facts about organic subjects are true in virtue of being 
true of the cosmic subject. In this way, Goff argues, organic subjects are sub-
sumed within the cosmic subject as a partial aspect of a given unity.33 On this 
view, the fundamental entity (the cosmos) is not a »homogenous blob« but is 
»structured« by its different aspects.34 These aspects may be considered (epis-
temologically) in isolation, but (ontologically) depend upon the existence of 
the whole.
If one has never been enamoured by materialism and reductive explana-
tions, then constitutive solutions to the combination problem may seem 
unnecessarily strange or sterile. Instead, a panpsychist, perhaps who has previ-
ously been associated with dualism or emergence theory, may prefer to search 
for a non-constitutive solution to the combination problem.
Aux7:  There are true facts about organic consciousness that are not true in virtue 
of facts about fundamental mentality. (Non-Constitutive Panpsychism)
A non-constitutive relation allows for new properties to arise within the com-
bined organic subject that are not present in the fundamental subject. The or-
ganic subject can be said to be caused by the fundamental subject(s), but to 
exist over-and-above the fundamental subject(s).
The most important micropsychist version of the non-constitutive relation 
(Aux4 + Aux7) is Emergent Panpsychism.35 As with emergence theory more 
widely, an emergent panpsychist can say that the body is the emergent base of 
the mind, and that the body gives rise to the mind due to some contingent laws 
of nature. But, importantly, as a panpsychist body this emergent base is a soci-
ety of micropsychist subjects who merge or infuse to create a single collective 
mind. The main advantage of this position is that no further theory of combi-
nation is required, instead the emergent mind is fundamental in the same way 
that a substance dualist affirms.36
33   Goff 2017b: 221-233. The terms ›aspect‹ and ›unity‹ are treated as primitive concepts 
that do not admit fundamental analysis. Goff uses examples to clarify these terms: one’s 
unified experience is often made up of different auditory, visual, and emotional aspects; 
a specific colour is a unity of different aspects of hue, saturation and lightness; states of 
affairs (electrons-having-negative-charge) are fundamental unities of which the object 
(electron) and the property (negative charge) are aspects.
34   Goff 2017b: 225-26.
35   Seager 2012; Seager 2010; Brüntrup 2017; Mørch 2014.
36   And thus, David J. Chalmers argues that emergent panpsychism suffers from the same 
difficultly as substances dualists in accounting for mental causation; Chalmers, 2017b, 
193-94.
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As long as Aux7 is not combined with Aux2 (panprotopsychism), then 
emergent panpsychism is not in danger of retreating into a (super)strong 
emergence theory, as is ruled out by PCT2. As a realist position regarding 
mentality (PCT1) and often realist concerning downward causation, emergent 
panpsychism cannot be confused with Weak Emergence either.37 That said, 
given that the rejection of emergence is a core thesis for panpsychism, many 
panpsychists are not willing to sail so close to the wind of emergence theory.
Finally, one might propose a non-constitutive model of individuation 
(Aux5 + Aux7). Such solutions are popular amongst cosmopsychists, but highly 
speculative and often phrased metaphorically. For example, Itay Shani em-
ploys aquatic metaphors where the universe is a »vast ocean of consciousness« 
or »oceanic plenum« and human subjects are »local disturbances coursing 
the ocean as currents, waves, streams, eddies, bubbles, ripples, and the like«.38 
Freya Mathews and Joseph Bracken, who both endorse panentheism, employ 
the language of systems theory; a self is a »system with a very special kind 
of goal, namely its own maintenance and self-perpetuation.«39 For Bracken, 
Ultimate Reality is a comprehensive system, in this technical sense, and is 
identified as the divine-life system, which includes the world and all creatures 
»as a sub-system within the higher-order system of the divine life«.40
This brings us to the theological implications of these variants of panpsy-
chism and so to the main investigative question of this paper: can panpsy-
chism aid panentheists in interpreting their two core metaphors in a way 
that demarcates their position from neighbouring theories of the God-world 
relationship? Although the two panentheistic slogans should ideally be held 
together they are treated somewhat separately in the two remaining sections 
of this paper. First, I focus on how micropsychist theories of combination 
(Aux4 + Aux6/Aux7) illuminate how the world might be God’s body, and sec-
ond I examine how cosmopsychist theories of individuation (Aux5 + Aux6/
Aux7) may elucidate how one subject may be said to be ›in‹ another subject, 
perhaps as the world is ›in‹ God.
37   Brüntrup 2017.
38   Shani 2015: 389-437, 411-412.
39   Mathews 2003:48. Mathews 2010.
40   Bracken 2015: 219. Bracken is clear that the aim of its systems-orientated approach is 
to »eliminate any kind of dualism, even dualism between God and the world of creation« 
p. 224.
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3. The World as God’s Panpsychist Body
The first panentheistic slogan draws explicitly on philosophy of mind in claim-
ing that ›the world is the body of God‹. There are as many ways to interpret this 
metaphor as there are positions in philosophy of mind. If God is an immaterial 
mind, and the world is a ›mindless‹ mechanical body over which God has di-
rect and total control, then a classical theist could easily employ this metaphor 
to depict the ontological separation between God and the world, as well as 
God’s total determination of all events.41 Yet, panentheists typically critique 
exactly this depiction of the mind-body, God-world relationships.42 The suc-
cess for this metaphor hinges almost entirely upon whether the panentheist 
can specify a mind-body relationship capable of performing the interpretative 
heavy-lifting necessary to demarcate panentheism from neighbouring theo-
logical positions.43
Western versions of panentheism have more recently turned to emergence 
theory to elucidate the metaphor of divine embodiment.44 Emergence theory 
states that consciousness emerges from the complex arrangements of the 
physical body, such that consciousness supervenes upon (is determined by, or 
is at least ontologically dependent upon) the body. Probably the most well-
known statement of »emergentist panentheism« is Philip Clayton’s »panen­
theistic analogy«, which suggests that God acts in the world in a way analogous 
to how the emergent mind (whole) acts through the body (parts) as its physical 
substrate.45
There have been, however, a number of critiques against employing emer-
gence theory to interpret the panentheist’s use of this metaphor. Niels Henrik 
Gregersen argues that, whilst the world as God’s body may have been an attrac-
tive metaphor in antiquity, the rise of emergence theory in philosophy of mind 
makes this metaphor unsuitable since, »God would appear as an emergent 
reality arising out of natural processes rather than the other way around.«46 
Emily Thomas compares the emergentist panentheism of Clayton, Peacocke 
and Morowtiz, unfavourably, with Samuel Alexander’s emergentist theology 
by arguing that emergence theory is quite simply incompatible with the claim 
that the universe is ›in‹ God. If God is the emergent whole or resultant then it 
41   T.J. Mawson even argues that »Classical Theism is committed to seeing the universe as 
God’s body.« Mawson 2006: 171.
42   McFague 1993: 144-145, 154-155.
43   Ward 2004, 62-68; Barua 2010.
44   Leidenhag 2013, 978.
45   Clayton 1997: 258-59.
46   Gregersen 2004: 20.
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can only be true to say that »deity is strictly contained ›in‹ the universe« and 
not the other way around.47 In summary, as I have argued elsewhere, the use of 
emergence theory entails the prioritization of the material and the subordina-
tion of the immaterial, which is in tension with much philosophy of religion 
and forms of theism, including panentheism.48 The unsuitability of emergence 
theory, in addition to a longstanding historical precedent, gives us good reason 
to turn to panpsychism instead.
Subject Panpsychism and Micropsychism (Aux1 + Aux4) give an account of 
the body as a society of subjects. If the world is a body in this sense, then the 
universe is a cosmic community, united by a shared relation to the whole/God. 
This seems congruent with panentheistic motivations towards a sacramental, 
ecological, and value-laden picture of the physical universe, and the rejec-
tion of inert, mechanistic views of materiality. An example of this approach is 
Hartshorne’s statement that »The world consists of individuals, but the totality 
of individuals as a physical or spatial whole is God’s body, the Soul of which is 
God.«49 Yet, what relation the bodily community of subjects will bear to God 
on this panpsychist interpretation of panentheism will depend upon the type 
of combinatorial relation that is adopted, Aux6 or Aux7.
3.1 Constitutive Micropsychism and God’s Body
If the micropsychist, subject panpsychist also adopts a constitutive relation 
(Aux1+ Aux4 + Aux6), then God will be the sum of the universe; all facts about 
God will be true in virtue of being true of some feature of the world. As such, 
God is constantly affected by the experiences and events in the world between 
creatures as a metaphysical necessity. Indeed, whilst ›God‹ would properly 
refer to the joint experience of the whole cosmic community, it would not be 
incorrect to refer to each subject as God in a derivative sense of participating 
in, even constituting, the divine body. This resonates with Lataster’s celebra-
tion of panentheism for lacking »an authoritarian deity dictating commands 
from on high. Only the divine can tell us what to do, but we are the divine!«50 
47   Thomas 2016.
48   Leidenhag 2016.
49   Hartshorne 1984: 94.
50   Lataster & Bilimoria 2018: 52. Similarly, Gregersen ties Christian panentheism to degree 
Christology, where Christological revelation is not unique to the person Jesus of Nazareth. 
Freya Mathews goes so far as to suggest that on panentheism/panpsychism,  »God with 
angels and burning bushes, the gods and goddess of Olympus and small hearth gods of 
Asia to Daoist immortals, fox faries, vision lakes, tertons, dragons, and rainbow serpants« 
are all »different emanations of the same material substratum«, that is »imbued with 
possibilities of inspiritment.« Mathews 2010: 234-35.
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The problem for panentheism here is that a constitutive relation may be too 
strong, and so fail to demarcate panentheism from pantheism.51 Not only do 
God and the world share a single substance, but there are no facts about God 
that are not also true of the world as a whole.52
3.2 Non-constitutive Micropsychism and God’s Body
If the panentheist adopts Micropsychism, Subject Panpsychism, and Non- 
constitutive Panpsychism (Aux1 + Aux4 + Aux7), then the picture changes 
substantially. The world is still the body of God as a combined plurality of sub-
jects or cosmic community, but God is not reducible to the sum of this plurality 
of subjects. As such, God may have properties, intentionality, experiences, or 
actions that are not true of individual organic subjects, nor true of the cos-
mic community as a whole. As such, the panentheists could now demarcate 
their position from pantheism and classical theism by claiming that, whilst 
God depends upon the world (contra classical theism), God also transcends 
the world (contra pantheism); there are true facts about God that are not true 
of the world, but all true facts about the world affect, and perhaps even effect, 
the very essence of God.
However, if the non-constitutive relation employed is the causal relation 
of emergence then on this model God again appears secondary and depen-
dent upon the universe, but the universe does not appear dependent upon 
God. Panentheism would then become a version of emergent theism. This 
conclusion may not be exclusive to emergent panpsychism but may be a ten-
dency within all varieties of micropyschism and (as argued above) traditional 
emergence, where the parts are taken as more fundamental than the whole. 
Therefore, a panentheist committed to divine creation/creativity of the world, 
to God’s logical priority over the world, or even God’s logically equality with 
the world, is more likely to find aid from cosmopsychism (Aux5) than micro-
psychism (Aux4).
51   Lataster stresses that many versions of panentheism hold that God and the world are 
the same substance, and in doing so classifies panentheism as a version of pantheism. 
Lataster 2014: 390-91, 392.
52   For more on pantheism and constitutive panpsychism, see Leidenhag 2018.
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4. Panpsychism ›in‹ God
The second panentheist slogan, »that the world exists within the Divine, although 
God is also more than the world«, is captured in the very name ›pan-en-theism‹.53 
Whilst a panentheist could abandon all notion of divine embodiment, she can-
not abandon the claim that ›all is in God‹ and still claim to be a pan-en-theist. 
Yet, as Gregersen writes, »the concept of panentheism is not stable in itself. 
The little word ›in‹ is the hinge of it all.«54 It is widely recognised that this 
small word ›in‹, »must bear the brunt of the interpretative burden« since it 
alone »holds the position together and distinguishes it from its rivals.«55 To 
achieve this, what is meant by ›the world being in God‹ must exclude, first, 
whatever it means for the world to be ›outside of God‹ (Classical Theism) and, 
second, ›identical to God‹ (pantheism).56 Third, to say that ›the world is in 
God‹ should not be identical to the claim that ›God is in the world‹; the tradi-
tional doctrine of divine omnipresence or indwelling.57 Whilst more contro-
versial, this third constraint is nothing more than the logical consequence of 
the first two. For if what it means for the world to be in God is identical to tradi-
tional notions of omnipresence then the defining statement of panentheism is 
no different from a statement adhered to by most classical theists. Similarly, if 
›God‹ and ›world‹ can dance around the word ›in‹ interchangeably then there 
is a risk of implying that these are synonymous concepts, as in many versions 
of pantheism.
In his constructive proposal to demarcate panentheism from neighbouring 
positions, R.T. Mullins suggests that panentheists should interpret the ›in‹ lit-
erally and not metaphorically. To do this, Mullins recommends that panenthe-
ists make metaphysical space and metaphysical time attributes of God—in 
Gregersen’s words, God has »roominess«.58 When this roomy God creates the 
universe, physical space and time are created within the divine metaphysical 
space and time. In this way, the universe and all its objects are literally ›in‹ 
God. This proposal, as Mullins intends, says something unique about God 
and so might be the beginnings of a successfully demarcated panentheism.59 
53   Clayton 2017: 1045
54   Gregersen 2004: 19.
55   Clayton 2004: 252; Peterson 2001: 396.
56   Göcke 2013: 63.
57   For example, Krishna’s teaching in the Bhagavad Gita is often labelled as panentheistic 
and not pantheistic because he teaches that whilst »everyone abides in him, he does not 
abide in them.« Lataster & Bilimoria 2018: 52. This is contrary to Clayton 2010: 184.
58   Mullins 2016: 342-344; Gregersen 2004: 20.
59   Mullins 2016: 243.
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However, it says nothing about God’s relationship to the world and very lit-
tle about the ontology of the world. As a result, Mullins’ proposal abandons 
most of panentheism’s motivators to be a more credibly scientific, relational, 
dynamic, view of God that can account for both the problem of evil and the 
reality of religious experience.60 A clear demarcation that fails to motivate the 
position is only marginally helpful to the panentheist. The question is, can 
panpsychism provide an equally clear demarcation of panentheism as Mullins’ 
proposal without sacrificing the motivating reasons to adopt panentheism in 
the first place?
Since, cosmopsychism (Aux5) starts with a single whole, which all finite or-
ganic subjects are contained within, it seems that the second panentheistic 
metaphor is a theological parallel to cosmopsychism. This retains both the lit-
eral reading of ›in‹ that Mullins argues for, but in both a mentalistic and spa-
tial sense, since on panpsychism subjectivity and extension are fundamentally 
united (PCT3). As Uwe Meixner comments,
It seems natural to identify the transcendental subject with God. The immediate 
consequence of this idea is that everything is in God (qua being in His total expe-
rience, which, at the same time, is the totality of all experiences), whether as an 
experience, as a subject of experience, or as an object of experience.61
Meixner identifies this version of cosmopsychism (Husserlian idealism) with 
a panentheism that provides »a real sense of the inner, the utterly intimate 
omnipresence of God.«62 As such, this cosmopsychist notion of how the world 
is ›in‹ God, such that the minds of the world exist by virtue of being part of 
God’s experience, also retains at least some of the main motivators of panen-
theism. It seems a promising start for the panentheist, therefore, to adopt 
PTC1-4 with Aux5. However, the panentheist will still need to adopt a theory 
of individuation and apply either a constitutive or non-constitutive relation to 
her understanding of the God-world relationship.
4.1 Constitutive Cosmopsychism
If applied to panentheism, Philip Goff ’s grounding by subsumption would 
mean that organic subjects are constitutive aspects of the divine. This already 
60   Panentheists need not be concerned with all these motivators, nor does their proposal 
need to be successful in achieving all these claims. But, I take it that a panentheists should 
be concerned with at least one of these in order to motivate her metaphysical claims in 
competition to competing models of God.
61   Meixner 2017: 399.
62   Ibid.
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invokes the mereological language that literal interpretations of panentheism 
prefer. It also captures the idea that discrete, individual subjects and objects 
are both dependent upon God and manifestations of the divine being, not as 
symbolic representations as a classical theism may hold, but in a more direct 
and ontological fashion.63 In a way similar to how Goff says that aspects of 
the cosmic consciousness can be distinguished epistemologically without 
ontological separation, Göcke describes panentheism as holding to a distinc-
tion between reality and ultimate reality »that is epistemologically needed for 
ultimate explanation, [but] cannot be a substantial ontological distinction 
between them for a variety of reasons.«64
Goff argues that his grounding by subsumption model only applies to sub-
ject cosmopsychism (Aux1+Aux5), since aspects of unities (unlike parts of 
composites) cannot have any properties, which are not had by the whole with-
in which they are subsumed; if aspects of the cosmos are subjects, then the 
cosmos must also be a subject. This may suit the personal view of God adopted 
by many (but not all) panentheists, demarcating it from, at least, impersonal 
versions of pantheism. He also suggests, however, that fundamental reality will 
not be a pure subject, but an impure subject with both experiential and non-
experiential aspects (consciousness+).65 Although Goff cannot tell us what 
exactly consciousness+ consists in, grounding by subsumption may yet tell us 
some things about the cosmic-subject/God. For example, the cosmic subject 
must be aware of all the experiences and first-person perspectives that are con-
tained within it as partial aspects, otherwise these partial aspects would have 
properties not had by the cosmic subject. To be clear, the cosmic subject does 
not know about the experiences of finite subjects in a third- or second-person 
kind of knowledge, as is the case in some definitions of omniscience and om-
nipresence in classical theism, but the cosmic subject experiences them as its 
own, in an unmediated first-person way. Indeed, my experiences just are the 
experiences of God in the partial aspect of God that is ›me‹. Since my experi-
ences are grounded in God’s experiences, there can be no separation between 
how I feel and how God feels.
We might compare this constitutive cosmopsychism to Linda Zagzebski’s 
proposal to add ›omnisubjectivity‹ as a divine attribute within classical theism. 
She argues that perfect knowledge of subjects and their first-person experienc-
es, such that God is present with creatures in their experiences, is a direct im-
plication of the classical theists’ commitment to omnipresence, omniscience 
63   Clayton 2010: 187-190.
64   Göcke 2017: 6.
65   Goff 2017b: 230.
Joanna Leidenhag - 9783957437303
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com07/23/2020 03:11:22PM
via free access
83Deploying Panpsychism for the Demarcation of Panentheism 
and omnipotence.66 Zagzebski proposes that an omnisubjective God maximal-
ly empathizes with all the conscious first-person states of creaturely subjects. 
She contrasts her proposal with a constitutive relation between the divine 
consciousness and human subjects for three reasons. Her first reason is that 
if the »One conscious self (God) has another conscious self (you) as a part.« 
Then, »[t]he self you thought you were is not a distinct self.«67 This alone may 
not concern panentheists or panpsychists, who could argue that we must de-
flate our notions of selfhood away from autonomous or fundamental unities. 
Second, Zagzebski points out the repercussions for relationality, since »if I am 
simply a part of God, I lose much of the point of addressing God as a distinct 
person«.68 There can be no second-personal I-Thou relationship in a whole-
part constitutive relation; this seems to me a serious problem for panentheists 
who claim to have a highly relational view of God. Third, Zagzebski defends 
her own view from The Moral Objection, which worries that if God empathizes 
with humanity then immoral dispositions and intentions are included into the 
life of God. Although Zagzebski applauds Charles Hartshorne sensitivity to 
the importance of divine empathy, she cites his understanding of the world as 
the body of God as incurring the full force of The Moral Objection, and thus 
departing from the tradition on the issue of absolute divine goodness and holi-
ness.69 This is a clear example of how the type of relation between God and the 
world has concrete implications for religious practice and ideas of who God is.
As an asymmetrical relation, grounding by subsumption may appear to de-
marcate this version of cosmopsychist panentheism from pantheism; since the 
world would be grounded in God (by subsumption), but God would not be 
grounded in the world and thus it seems that God and the world cannot be 
strictly identical. However, this demarcation fails. For whilst it is true that God 
bears an asymmetrical relation to organic or finite subjects (such as human 
beings), God does not bear such an asymmetrical relation to the world (uni-
verse or multiverse) as a whole. Indeed, a constitutive relation means that the 
cosmic subject is not more than the world, but is just the sum of its parts; the 
total consciousness+ in the world when it is not individuated.70 The world as 
a whole is not a partial aspect of God, but simply is God. Goff considers this a 
problem for theological appropriations of his theory of mind. He comments,
66   Zagzebski 2013: 10-25.
67   Zagzebski 2013: 24.
68   Ibid.
69   Ward 2004: 70.
70   Leidenhag 2018.
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Cosmopsychism does not entail pantheism. We need not think of the universe 
as a supremely intelligent rational agent…. It is more plausible to think that the 
consciousness of the universe is simply a mess.71
Many pantheists will, justly, complain that Goff ’s depiction of their deity as 
»a supremely intelligent rational agent« is a mischaracterisation. However, 
Goff ’s assumption that his position is closest to some form of pantheism and 
his warning that any cosmic deity resulting from his philosophy of mind will 
lack mental (rational, emotional, experiential, violation) coherence or clarity 
should be of concern to panentheists.
4.2 Panentheism and Non-constitutive Cosmopsychism
The problem of a ›messy‹ God is avoided by a cosmopsychist panentheism 
that adopts the non-constitutive model of individuation (Aux7). The most 
common example of a non-constitutive relation is the contingent and causal 
relation described in emergence theory. When combined with cosmopsychism 
this becomes something like a reverse emergence theory, where the whole sys-
tem (›the ocean‹) logically precedes and causes the parts (sub-systems or ›ed-
dies‹) to endure semi-independently for a time. Unlike emergent panentheism 
or emergent panpsychism, the adoption of cosmopsychism buttresses this ver-
sion of panpsychism from the previous criticisms. If the panentheist were to 
adopt a non-constitutive cosmopsychism (Aux5 + Aux7) they would still be 
able to claim that God is logically prior to and the causal ground of all other 
subjects, whilst also being of one substance with all finite beings. The world is 
a contingent, rather than a necessary, aspect of God.
The non-constitutive relation means that the cosmic consciousness is more 
than the sum of its partial aspects. Therefore, the cosmic substrate, the divine 
ocean of consciousness, need not experience all (morally problematic) finite 
intentions, thoughts, emotions as its own. Indeed, the fundamental level of 
mentality need not be personal or a subject at all. That is, a non-constitutive 
relation (Aux7) is compatible with subject panpsychism (Aux1), panexperi-
entialism (Aux2) or panprotopsychism (Aux 3), in a way grounding by sub-
sumption was not. Therefore, a non-constitutive cosmopsychism allows the 
panentheist to adopt either a personal, impersonal or more-than-personal 
view of God. The demarcation between pantheism and panentheism is upheld 
by the contingent causal relation between God and the subjects/objects we call 
›the world‹. In terms of holding together agency at both the cosmic-divine level 
and the organic level, this position gives no immediate relief to the problems 
71   Goff 2017b: 246.
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of epiphenomenalism and overdetermination that challenge ontologies with 
fundamental agents existing on multiple levels, but this is not a unique or de-
feating problem for non-constitutive cosmopsychism/panentheism.72
This non-constitutive relation between God and the world means that 
there is a logically possible state of affairs where God, as the cosmic conscious-
ness, was the only consciousness in existence and none of the finite objects 
and subjects of the world were yet to individuate themselves from the divine 
substance or consciousness. What we may have in a non-constitutive cosmo-
psychist interpretation of panentheism is an origin of finite subjects/objects 
through emanation from the divine substance; creation ex deo, not creation 
ex nihilo. Contrary to classical theism, this emanation not only takes place 
within the substance of God, rather than from absolute nothingness, but indi-
viduation results from a kind of contingent law or principle of the divine being 
itself, rather than an act of the divine will. This corresponds with a number of 
statements from panentheists that emanation implies that God is »bodying 
[the world] forth, generating all life from her being« and that creation is »a 
self-transformation of the divine being«.73
5. Conclusion
This paper has explored whether panpsychism can illuminate the two panen-
theistic slogans in such a way that panentheism can be clearly demarcated 
from neighbouring positions. Whilst panpsychism may be combined with 
any model of God, panpsychism’s account of the mind-body relation and 
fundamental-organic consciousness relation do seem to provide a framework 
for interpreting the panentheists metaphors in a distinctive manner. This is a 
promising start, but further work will be needed to develop this into a more 
thorough demarcation and version of panentheism. Since evocatively power-
ful ambiguities have plagued panentheism in the past, I have employed pan-
psychism’s auxiliary theses in addition to the core panpsychist theses to try 
and make this discussion as specific and concrete as possible. It is clear from 
the resulting analysis that these auxiliaries make a great deal of difference to 
the interpretation of panentheism’s core metaphors. Future scholars should 
keep these particularities in mind when exploring or asserting any correspon-
dence between panpsychism and panentheism. In the end, a cosmopsychism 
that posits a non-constitutive relation between the cosmic consciousness and 
72   Chalmers 2017b: 194.
73   McFague 1993: 152; Göcke 2017: 7.
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organic subjects seems to mirror the kind of relationship between God and the 
world posited by panentheists most faithfully. However, there is much more to 
be done on this and panpsychists themselves are at no agreement concerning 
the possibility of such individuation; panentheists will need to pay attention 
to this ongoing debate. For now, it seems that there may be a way of employing 
panpsychism for the demarcation of panentheism, but as to whether panen-
theism is a plausible or desirable theology is a separate question and one I will 
leave panentheists to argue for.
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